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Abstract 
 
The paper examines whether the Arab Spring phenomenon was predictable by complete 
elimination in the dispersion of core demands for better governance, more jobs and stable 
consumer prices. A methodological innovation of the Generalized Methods of Moments is 
employed to assess the feasibility and timing of the revolution.  The empirical evidence 
reveals that from a projection date of 2007, the Arab Spring was foreseeable between 2011 
and 2012. The paper contributes at the same time to the empirics of predicting revolutions and 
the scarce literature on modeling the future of socio-economic events. Caveats and cautions 
are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
  
 The unending Arab Spring has raised concerns in policymaking and academic circles 
(Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012). Egypt is facing a serious political dilemma: the conception 
and definition of democracy in the country has been revisited and revised in many instances 
with the erosion of investor confidence and the country is facing critical economic challenges. 
The recent presidential elections and ratification of a new constitution have led to a quasi-
military regime. In Tunisia, the democratic transition has failed blatantly and there are 
continuous waves of social disruptions and political assassinations that are significantly 
affecting economic activity. The law of the land in Libya is determined by armed groups that 
ousted Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, tribal tensions are high and the new authorities are 
worried about prospects of stabilization because they can neither disarm nor control old and 
new armed groups originating from the anti-Gaddafi rebellion. Yemen’s revolutionary 
movement that achieved its first victory with the ousting of President Ali Abdullah Saleh is 
also facing serious transition problems as regional insurgencies and daunting economic threats 
are squandering the opportunity of repairing Yemen’s failing socio-political contract (Thiel, 
2012). The situation in Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe and neither side of the battle is 
winning the war nor are they willing to enter into talks for a political settlement without 
preconditions. In light of the above, the immediate short-term effects of the Arab Spring have 
not been appealing.  
 Against this background, a substantial number of qualitative studies have recently 
examined the causes, consequences, trends and circumstances leading to the Arab Spring. 
Inter alia, they include: a chain of foreign affairs assessments (Anderson, 2011; Goldstone, 
2011; Doran, 2011; Shehata, 2011; Blyth & Taleb, 2011; Hamid, 2011); the role of social 
media (Howard et al., 2011; Stepanova, 2011; Khondker, 2011) and  economic consequences 
(Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012; Quilter-Pinner & Symons, 2013). Despite this growing body 
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of literature, we still know very little about the extent of predictability of the Arab Spring. The 
concern as to whether the phenomenon was foreseeable has remained an empirical challenge 
and a debate in academic and policymaking circles (Gause, 2011). Maybe timely socio-
economic, institutional and political reforms might have been adopted by affected countries to 
mitigate unappealing short-term effects had the uprising been predictable. The purpose of the 
present study is to examine this assertion. 
The intuition motivating a study on the Arab Spring predictability is typically 
consistent with the cross-country income catch-up and convergence literature that has been 
investigated and  extensively documented in the context of neoclassical growth models and 
recently extended to other fields of economic development (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; 
Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro  & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Fung, 
2009 ; Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013a; Andrés 
& Asongu, 2013). Hence, reporting facts even in the absence of a formal theoretical model is 
not a useless scientific activity. In essence, applied econometrics should not be limited to the 
simple empirical exercise of either refuting or validating economic theories (Costantini & 
Lupi, 2005; Narayan et al., 2011).  
In light of the above, it is reasonable to expect a general chaos after a complete 
mitigation of dispersion in factors that cause socio-political unrest for the two main reasons. 
First, evidence of convergence in deplorable politico-economic conditions implies that 
countries of poor governance standards are catching-up with their counterparts of very poor 
governance. Second, full catch-up indicates that cross-country politico-economic differences 
are absent, so that any spark of protest or revolution in one country can easily spread across 
borders. In other words, the possibility of cross-country revolution is completely harmonized 
with a timeline contingent on the period of full catch-up (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Asongu, 
2013b). 
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The unappealing signals that could incite social unrest used in the study include: poor 
governance (political, economic and institutional), unemployment and consumer price 
inflation. A recent methodological innovation in the estimation of beta-convergence is 
employed.  The paper contributes to the literature in two key ways.  First, it builds on the 
empirics of predicting revolutions and the scarce empirical literature on modeling the future 
of socio-economic events.  Second, much of the empirical studies on the Arab Spring uprising 
have been exploratory in nature or mostly focused on the impact of political instability on 
macroeconomic and structural variables (Aisen & Veiga, 2006; Anderson, 2011; Goldstone, 
2011; Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012; Quilter-Pinner & Symons, 2013; Thiel, 2012; Aisen and 
Veiga, 2013). We fill this gap by providing the first empirical assessment on whether 
forecasting the timing of the Arab Spring was feasible.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews existing 
literature and discusses the motivation for the empirics. The data and methodology are 
covered in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, discussion of results and 
policy implications. We conclude with Section 5.  
 
2. Review of literature and motivation for the empirics 
The purpose of this section is twofold. First it provides a summary of the literature on the 
causes, trends, consequences and circumstances leading to civil unrest in the Arab region in 
the recent past. Second, it highlights the key features of the convergence theory which 
underpins the argument in this paper. 
   
2.1 Brief literature Survey 
 A substantial amount of qualitative studies has recently examined the causes, trends, 
consequences and circumstances leading to the Arab Spring. For instance, Anderson (2011) 
has demystified the Arab Spring by parsing the differences between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. 
The weakness and resilience in Middle Eastern autocracies have been exhaustively discussed 
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by Goldstone (2011) to improve a general understanding of revolutions, while Hamid (2011) 
has been more concerned about the rise of Islamists and how they would influence politics 
and vice versa. An assessment of the beneficiaries of the second Arab revolution has also 
been provided by Doran (2011), while Shehata (2011) has discussed how Mubarak’s reign 
came to an end in Egypt. Blyth & Taleb (2011) provide a more global outlook by assessing 
how suppressing volatility makes the world less predictable and more dangerous.  
 The role of social media in the Arab Spring has also received much scholarly 
attention. Howard et al (2011) analyzed over 3 million tweets and gigabytes on YouTube 
content and thousands of blog posts to establish that social broadcasting played a critical role 
in shaping the political debates of the revolution. Stepanova (2011) came to the same 
conclusion but advocated some caution on generalization: reservations about the applicability 
of any direct lessons’ to other sociopolitical and regional contexts. The suppositions of the 
first-two authors are supported by Khondker (2011) with an addition that the absence of an 
open media and civil society in Arab countries prior to the Spring was a factor in itself in the 
social and political consequences of the new media.   
 As far as we are aware, the few quantitative papers that have investigated the 
phenomenon have been exploratory in nature, discussing correlations not causalities 
(Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012; Quilter-Pinner & Symons, 2013). Khandelwal & Roitman 
(2012) have examined comparable historical episodes of political instability in order to derive 
medium- and near-term economic implications. They have concluded that recent economic 
progress in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in transition is unfolding 
along lines of past episodes of political instability, a sluggish recovery in the medium-term 
and a sharp deterioration of macroeconomic variables. In light of these challenges, Quilter-
Pinner & Symons (2013) provide recommendations for the United Kingdom (UK) on reforms 
to promote more inclusive and stable growth vis-à-vis inter alia the transition countries, IMF 
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programs and the Great Eight (G8) presidency. Against this backdrop, there has also been a 
wave of studies investigating the economic consequences of political instability in the global 
context (Aisen & Veiga, 2013).  
 Despite this growing body of literature, we still know very little about the 
predictability of the Arab Spring: an empirical challenge and source of debate in academic 
and policy making circles (Gause, 2011).  
 
2.2 Theoretical highlights and motivation for the empirics 
 
 Consistent with Asongu (2014), the initial theories of growth that evolved with the fall 
of Keynesianism and re-emergence of the neoclassical revolution favored the concept of 
convergence.  Nascent theories of economic growth that predicted absolute convergence were 
based on an extension of market equilibrium concepts (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010). Hence, it 
followed that cross-country economic catch-up resulted from policies of free market 
competition. In essence, the implementation of free market policies were supporting of 
convergence. The absence of catch-up (or absolute divergence) in initial income convergence 
studies (Barro, 1991) was later verified by Pritchett (1997) in the long-term. They maintain 
that under the exogenous neoclassical growth model, income convergences to a common 
steady state or to each country’s long-run equilibrium irrespective of initial levels.  By 
contrast, the endogenous growth theory predicts that income-level convergence is not feasible 
for two main reasons: the possibility of multiple equilibria and differences in initial 
endowments among countries.  
The intuition motivating this examination is typically consistent with cross-country 
income catch-up and convergence literature that has been investigated and substantially 
documented in the context of neoclassical growth model, originally developed by the seminal 
works of Baumol (1986), Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro  & Sala-i-Martin 
(1992, 1995). The theoretical underpinnings (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) of the income catch-
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up literature have recently been applied to other areas of economic development. In essence, 
whereas there is a consensus on an underlying theory on income catch-up, other development 
branches do not yet have a theory for the reduction in cross-country dispersions in 
development parameters. Against this background, there has been a growing body of catch-up 
empirics in many development fields. Accordingly, there is currently a wealth of development 
literature applying convergence underpinnings to, inter alia: financial markets (Bruno et al., 
2011; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013b) and, intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
harmonization (Asongu, 2013a).  
In light of the above, we are aware of the risk of ‘doing measurement without theory’. 
Reporting facts even in the absence of a formal theoretical model is not a useless scientific 
activity
1
. In this spirit, we are consistent with Costantini & Lupi, (2005) and Narayan et al. 
(2011)  in the postulation that applied econometrics should not be limited to the simple 
empirical exercise of either refuting or validating economic theories. Our risks are carefully 
calculated because of the heterogeneous nature of growth empirics (Islam, 1995). Even 
Blinder (1987) did not shock monetary scholars and policy makers when he completely 
banished interest rates in his credit rationing model
2
. 
 The object of this paper invites one main question on the theoretical underpinnings of 
the empirics: why should we expect a complete elimination in the dispersion of factors that 
cause socio-political uprisings to predict the possibility of general chaos? The answer 
provides a theoretical timing for any unrest (potential social uprising, political instability or 
revolutions) without distinction of nationality or locality within a homogonous population for 
two main reasons. First, the evidence of catch-up in deplorable politico-economic conditions 
                                                 
1
  For example, “The reader should understand that this is merely an expositional device. We would not wish to 
deny that the interest elasticity and anticipatory error mechanisms have some validity. But the spirit of this 
paper is that those mechanisms do not seem important enough to explain the deep recessions that are apparently 
caused by central bank policy” (Blinder,  1987, p. 2). 
2
  “In order to make credit rationing mechanism stand out in bold relief, most other channels of monetary policy 
(such as interest elasticities and anticipatory errors) are banished from the model” (Blinder,  1987, p. 2).  
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means countries with better governance (political, economic and institutional) are catching-up 
with counterparts with worse governance. Second, full catch-up indicates that the cross-
country politico-economic differences do not exist so that any spark of protest or revolution in 
one country can easily spread across borders.  
 Generally speaking, the inference from the aforementioned literature is that with full 
catch-up, factors that incite unrest are similar across countries. Hence, revolutions can spread 
without distinction of locality or nationality. In other words, the possibility of revolutions is 
completely harmonized across countries with a timeline contingent on the period of full catch-
up. Convergence in negative signals of revolt could spread revolutionary movements across 
nations because the states become indifferent in signals of revolt.  Accordingly, the presence 
of catch-up implies that countries with lower levels in the negative signals are catching-up 
their counterparts with higher levels in the negative signals.  It is interesting to note that the 
objective of the study is not to discuss when and where revolutionary movements originate. 
The intuition for the empirics emphasizes that with full catch-up, a spark of protest in a 
country can spread to other states without distinction of nationality within a homogenous 
panel.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 We assess a sample of 14 MENA countries from the World Bank Development 
Indicators for the period 1996-2006.  The choice of time period has a twofold justification. 
First, governance indicators are only available from 1996. Second, given the possible 
investigation horizon of fifteen years (1996-2010), a certain margin is needed from a 
projection date (say 2007) to the occurrence of the Arab Spring (2011 onwards). Hence, due 
to constraints in (1) the computations of non-overlapping intervals and (2) degrees of freedom 
needed for the estimation of conditional catch-ups, the projection base-year is set at 2007.  
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 In line with the hypothetical underpinnings discussed in Section 2, we follow recent 
theoretical and empirical literature in measuring common determinants of the Arab Spring in 
terms of political governance, economic governance, institutional governance and general 
governance, unemployment and inflation in consumer prices (Jung, 2011; Storck, 2011; 
Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012; Thiel, 2012). Political governance (voice & accountability and 
political stability), economic governance (government effectiveness and regulation quality), 
institutional governance (rule of law and corruption control), general governance (political, 
economic & institutional) indicators are obtained with Principal Component Analysis (see 
Section 3.2.1). Classifications of governance indicators into political, economic and 
institutional components is consistent with Kaufmann et al (2010) and recent African 
governance literature (Andrés et al., 2014). 
 We control for recently documented determinants of the Arab Spring, notably: 
economic prosperity, government expenditure, external balances, population growth and trade 
openness (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012). Accordingly, a deterioration of macroeconomic 
conditions could quickly lead to political unrest. Economic growth or macroeconomic 
uncertainty and deterioration of the economic fundamentals could either decrease or increase 
unemployment as a result of sizable output gains or losses. Very substantial external 
vulnerabilities can induce added pressures for insurrection and significant currency 
depreciation which could lead to high levels of inflation. There is also a general consensus 
among economists that high inflation could generate inefficiencies that eventually lead to 
social unrest due to reduction in economic growth and general social welfare (Aisen & Veiga, 
2006). Greater flexibility in trade and government expenditure could influence access to 
employment and other economic opportunities. Moreover, the likelihood of political 
instability is significantly reduced when populations see governments delivering a higher 
standard of living.  
11 
 
 Details of the descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, variable definitions and 
fundamental panels are presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 
respectively. From the summary statistics, there is some degree of variation in the data such 
that reasonable estimated nexuses could emerge. The correlation analysis serves to mitigate 
any potential concerns of multicollinearity and overparameterization. For robustness purposes 
we disaggregate the MENA into various fundamental panels: Middle East, North Africa, 
Short unrests, Long-unrests and Unrests
3
.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis 
 The high degree of substitution among governance indicators means some information 
could be irrelevant. Appendix 5 shows that the set of governance indicators are highly 
correlated. . Hence, we employ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to mitigate the 
redundancy of common information in the political, economic, institutional and general 
governance indicators. PCA is a statistical method that is often used to reduce the large group 
of correlated indicators into a small set of uncorrelated indicators called principal components 
(PCs) which represent most of the variation in the original dataset. Accordingly, we reduce 
our six governance indicators to one common factor (general governance), then we further 
reduce the constituents of governance dynamics into three distinct variables. The first is 
political governance (Polgov) comprising voice and accountability and political stability. 
Polgov captures the constancy in the process by which those in authority are selected and 
replaced. The second is economic governance (Ecogov)  involving regulation quality and 
government effectiveness. Ecogov denotes the capacity of government to formulate and 
implement policies as well as deliver services. The third is institutional governance (Instgov) 
                                                 
3
 MENA: Middle East and North Africa. ME: Middle East. NA: North Africa. MENASU: MENA Short Unrests. MENALU: 
MENA Long Unrests. MENAU: MENA Unrests. Classification of degree of unrest (Short-unrest or Long-unrest) is based on 
exploratory evidence and qualitative content analysis on the severity of country-specific internal strife.  
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consisting of the rule of law and corruption control. Instgov  represents the respect for citizens 
and the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them (Andrés et al., 2014).   
 The criterion used to retain common factors is consistent with Kaiser (1974) and 
Jolliffe (2002), who have recommended only PCs with a corresponding eigenvalue greater 
than one. For example, from Table 1 below, it can be noticed that: General governance 
(G.Gov) has an eigenvalue of 4.318 and represents more than 72 percent  of variation in the 
six variables (government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law, corruption control, 
voice and accountability and political stability/no violence.  
We do not perform country by country time series PCA before combining them into a 
panel PCA. Hence, we are aware that using data from all countries could generate artificial 
common patterns among the countries, which is an interest in panel data analysis.  
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.248 0.369 0.431 0.456 0.456 0.447 0.719 0.719 4.318 
Second  PC -0.832 0.527 -0.130 -0.009 0.091 0.069 0.156 0.876 0.941 
Third PC 0.469 0.575 -0.627 -0.192 -0.060 0.128 0.059 0.936 0.358 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.544 0.544 1.089 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.455 1.000 0.910 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.931 0.931 1.863 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.068 1.000 0.136 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.926 0.926 1.852 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.073 1.000 0.147 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
The interest of using four different measurements of governance is to increase the 
intricacy and robustness for more policy implications. Accordingly, since the governance 
variables are used independently across specifications and fundamental characteristics, the 
issue of contamination is less apparent at the empirical level. At the variable level, the 
combination of variables to indexes is to remain consistent with the definition of indicators. 
For instance, if political governance is defined as a combination of voice and accountability 
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and political stability, neither the former nor the latter can objectively be defined as political 
stability. A common denominator in both, through PCA is a better perception. Hence, the PCs 
generate regressors that are consistent with the definitions of composite indicators employed 
in the study. It should also be noted that, the PCs do not generate a regressor problem in the 
context examined in the paper because they are used independently as dependent variables. 
Some potential degree of correlation among dependent governance variables only adds 
subtlety to the analysis. It is important to distinguish the effects of economic, political and 
institutional components of general governance indicator because they reflect different policy 
variables.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
Many convergence approaches have been discussed in theoretical and empirical 
literature (Islam, 2003). In essence, differences exist in ways in which reduction in 
dispersions could be measured: income-convergence versus (vs) TFP (total factor 
productivity)-convergence; global-convergence vs. local or club-convergence; convergence 
within an economy vs. convergence across economies; deterministic-convergence vs. 
stochastic convergence; unconditional (absolute) vs. conditional convergence; convergence in 
terms of growth rate vs. convergence in terms of income and beta-convergence vs. sigma-
convergence.  
It is also worthwhile noting that there is some measure of nexus between the various 
catch-up definitions and the corresponding methodologies employed. Due to some 
circumstances, the correspondence could not be unique: for example formal and informal 
cross-sectional techniques, time series procedures (in part) and panel techniques have 
conditionally or unconditionally investigated beta-convergence. A plethora of the approaches 
have substantially focused on per capita income catch-up across economies. In addition, both 
panel and cross-sectional approaches have been employed to investigated TFP and club-
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convergence. While the time series approach has been employed to assess catch-up across-
economies as well as within an economy, the cross-sectional technique has been used to 
investigate sigma-convergence. Last but not the least, the distribution techniques have been 
employed in the assessment of the whole structure of within-distribution and distribution 
dynamics  
The theoretical underpinnings of growth rate and income-level convergence have 
largely been based on the beta-convergence technique. It is founded on the supposition of 
higher capital marginal productivity in countries that are capital-scarce. It is assumed that 
poorer countries will grow faster only if they have similar saving rates which approach their 
richer counterparts. Under this scenario, a negative nexus between the initial income-level and 
the subsequent growth rate reflect some catch-up, known as beta (β)- convergence. However, 
as a shortcoming of this technique, a reduction in dispersion due to a negative beta may not 
necessarily reflect mitigation in dispersion. This shortcoming has led to the notion of sigma-
convergence: the cross-sectional distribution’s standard deviation of either growth rate or 
income-level. In spite of the drawback of beta-convergence being not a sufficient, but a 
necessary condition for sigma-convergence, researchers have continued to use this estimation 
strategy because it discloses information on structural growth models, while such parameters 
are not generally provided by the distribution approach. 
The beta-convergence adopted in these empirics is broadly in line with the 
underpinnings of recent catch-up literature (Narayan et al., 2011). The estimation strategy is 
typically consistent with substantial evidence of income convergence across countries that 
have been assessed within the framework of pioneering studies in classical growth models 
(Baumol, 1986; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992). 
The two equations below denote the standard procedures for assessing conditional 
beta-convergence if  tiW ,  is considered as strictly exogenous (Fung, 2009).  
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titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln(             (1) 
 
tititititi WYaY ,,,, )ln()ln(                           (2) 
 
Where a = 1+ β, tiY ,  is the measure of governance or the macroeconomic (inflation and 
unemployment) situation in country i at period t.  tiW ,  is a vector of determinants of 
governance, unemployment and inflation,  i  is a country-specific effect,  t  is a time- 
specific constant and  ti ,  an error term. In accordance with the neoclassical growth model, a 
negative and statistically significant beta coefficient in Eq. (1) means that countries relatively 
close to their steady state of governance will experience a slowdown in the growth or 
improvement of governance known as conditional convergence (Narayan et al., 2011, p. 
2773).  In the same vein, according to Fung (2009, p. 59), if  10  a in Eq. (2), then  tiY ,  is 
dynamically stable around the  path with a trend growth rate similar to that of  tW  and with a 
height relative to the level of tW .  Indicators contained in tiW ,  and the individual effect i  
are proxies for the long-term level bad governance is converging to. In essence, the country- 
specific effect i  measures other factors determining a country’s steady state that are not 
captured by tiW , .  
 The conditions for catch-up as emphasized above are valid only if tiW ,  is strictly 
exogenous. In reality, unfortunately, this is not the case because components of tiW ,  (GDPg, 
trade, government expenditure, external balance, population growth) influence  
governance, unemployment and inflation, the reverse incidence is also possible as the 
deterioration of governance affects economic prosperity and other macroeconomic variables 
in the conditioning information set. For example, while there is a wide consensus among 
economists that inflation reduces society’s welfare value as a result of poor governance, it is 
no less true that the quality of institutions favor political stability (Aisen & Veiga, 2006).  
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Hence, we are faced with another concern of endogeneity since components of tiW ,  are 
correlated with the error term ( ti , ). Moreover, time- and country-specific impacts could be 
correlated with other indicators in the model as is often the case when lagged endogenous 
variables are introduced into the equations. A measure for  tackling this issue of the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and individual specific-effects consists of 
suppressing the individual-effect by first differencing. Hence Eq. (2) becomes:  
)()()())ln()(ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,,     tititttitititititi WWYYaYY       (3)  
 
 Unfortunately, estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) still produces biased 
estimators as there is still some correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent 
variable. Arellano & Bond (1991) have proposed usage of the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) that exploits all the orthogonality conditions between the error term and the 
lagged endogenous variables. The procedure uses lagged levels of the variables as instruments 
in the differenced equation and lagged differences of the variables as instruments in the level 
equation, thus making-use of all the orthogonality conditions between the error term and the 
lagged dependent variables. We are consistent with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4)
4
 in preferring 
the System GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) to the 
Difference GMM estimation (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  
 The GMM estimation strategy which combines Equations (2) and (3) has been widely 
used in recent catch-up literature. In the specification of the estimation, we apply the two-step 
GMM  to account for heteroscedasticity in the residuals.  Accordingly, the one-step procedure 
is homoscedasticity-consistent. The hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation in the 
                                                 
4
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical 
application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth 
research”. (Bond et al. 2001, pp. 3-4).  
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residuals is important as past lagged regressors are to be employed as instruments for the 
dependent variables. The estimation depends on hypothesis that the lagged values of the 
endogenous variables and other independent regressors are valid instruments in the 
regression. We expect the first order autocorrelation (AR [1]) of the residuals to be significant 
while the (AR [2]) should not be. The latter is more valid because it measures the 
autocorrelation in difference. The Sargan overidentifying (OIR)  test is used to assess the 
validity of the instruments.  
 Consistent with Islam (1995, p. 323), yearly time spans are not appropriate for 
studying catch-up because they are too short.  In such brief time spans short-run disturbances 
may loom substantially large. Hence, considering the  eleven year period (1996 through 
2006), we use two-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI)
5
. In addition to the justifications 
provided above, we present three more reasons for the choice of two-year NOI. First and 
foremost, NOI with higher numerical values absorb business cycle disturbances while 
weakening the model. In essence, owing to the need to exploit the time series properties as 
much as possible, two-year NOI are preferred to three/four/five-year NOI. Second, 
conditional catch-up modeling requires more degrees of freedom. Therefore given the short-
span of eleven years, higher order NOI will substantially limit the conditioning information 
set. This is essential in order to avoid misspecification in the conditional estimations. Hence, 
due to issues in degrees of freedom, the order of NOI bears an inverse relationship with the 
number of control variables employed. Third, from a heuristic perspective, visual analysis 
does not reveal any evidence of persistent short-term (business cycle) disturbances that justify 
higher NOI.  The three explanations provided above have also been used to justify the choice 
of two-year NOI in recent catch-up literature (Asongu, 2013a).  
                                                 
5
 Accordingly, we have six two-year non-overlapping intervals: 1996; 1997-1998; 1999-2000; 2001-2002; 2003-
2004 ; & 2005-2006. The first value is short by one year due to issues in degrees of freedom.  
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 In order to investigate the degree of diminishing dispersion in governance, 
unemployment and inflation measures, we compute the implied rate of catch-up by 
calculating  a/2. Therefore, we divide the estimated value of the lagged endogenous variable 
by 2 because we have employed two-year NOI to absorb short-run disturbances. The criterion 
used to evaluate the existence of catch-up is the following: 10  a . This means that the 
absolute value of the estimated lagged dependent variable is less than one but greater than 
zero. The implication is that past variations have a less proportionate effect on future 
variations,  indicating that the difference on the left hand side of equation (3) is diminishing 
overtime or that the country is moving to a steady state.  
 It is important to note that in a standard dynamic GMM approach, the estimated 
lagged value is a  from which 1 is subtracted to obtain β (β= a-1). Hence, within this 
framework, 0  is the information criterion for beta-convergence. For clarity and in order 
to reduce arithmetical  exercises, a could be reported instead of β and the underlying 
information criterion ( 10  a ) used to assess catch-up. This latter interpretation is 
consistent with the bulk of recent literature (Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak 
& Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23). 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Presentation of results  
 This section examines three main concerns: (1) investigation of diminishing 
dispersions (or catch-up) in the dependent variables of interest (governance, unemployment 
and inflation); (2) determination of the level of reduction in dispersions (rate of catch-up) and; 
(3) computation of the time required for the complete elimination of dispersions (time 
required for full catch-up). The first issue guides the empirics on the feasibility of similar 
conditions in the dependent variables across countries, the second determines the degree of 
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similarity in such conditions, while the third reflects the time required for the similarity to be 
complete and dissimilarities indistinguishable across countries. In other words, the possibility 
of civil unrest in one country spreading to other countries due to similar conditions: the 
explosion of unrest without distinction of locality or nationality.  
 Table 2 below summarizes overall findings whereas Tables 3 and 4 respectively 
present results for absolute (unconditional) and conditional catch-up. The former is estimated 
with only the lagged difference of the dependent variable as an exogenous variable, whereas 
the latter incorporates the conditioning information set (control variables). In other words, 
unconditional catch-up is estimated in the absence of tiW , : vector of determinants (economic 
prosperity, trade, government expenditure, external balances and population growth) of the 
dependent variables (governance, unemployment and inflation).  
 In order to examine the validity of the models and hence the catch-up hypotheses, we 
performs two tests: (1) the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation that investigates the null 
hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation and (2) the Sargan test that examines the 
overidentification restrictions. In essence, this latter test examines if the instruments are not 
correlated with the error term in the main equation and its null hypothesis is the position that 
the instruments are strictly exogenous as a group (absence of endogeneity). The Wald 
statistics for the joint significance of estimated coefficients are also reported. Overwhelmingly 
for the most of the models: (1) the null hypotheses for the Sargan and AR(2) tests are not 
rejected and (2) the null hypothesis of the Wald statistics is rejected when estimated 
coefficients are significant.  
 Given the empirical dimension of this paper, we also devote some space to briefly 
discuss the computation of catch-up rates and time required for full catch-up or complete 
elimination of cross-country dispersions. For an estimated lagged initial value of 0.789 that is 
significant with valid instruments and no autocorrelation in the residuals: (1) the catch-up rate 
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is 39.45% ([0.789/2]*100) and (2) the length of time needed for full catch-up is 5.06 years 
(200%/39.45%). Hence, 5 years and about 21 days are needed to achieve 100% catch-up for 
an estimated initial value of 0.789 that is consistent with the information criterion: 10  a . 
 Table 2 below presents a summary of the findings. This synthesis of the results is 
based on Tables 3 and 4. While the first half of  Table 2 presents findings on Difference 
GMM modeling, the second-half shows results from System GMM estimations. The findings 
of the latter are more significant than those of the former. Panels A and B   are based on 
absolute (unconditional) convergence. The results of absolute convergence are also relatively 
more significant than those of conditional convergence.  Since potential biases in the 
Difference estimator are corrected by the System estimator, our policy recommendations are 
based on the latter estimation strategy.   
 In light of the above, the following findings could be established. First, under political 
governance the rate of absolute convergence (AC) varies between 20% and 39% per annum 
(p.a) with corresponding years to full convergence of 10 and 5.12years respectively. There is 
no evidence of conditional convergence (CC) in this governance dynamic. Second, with 
respect to economic governance, the rate of catch-up varies from 41.5% p.a to 49% p.a with 
corresponding period to full catch-up of between 4.81 and 4.08years. Third, under the 
scenario of institutional governance, full convergence is achieved between 4.39 and 5.55 
years, resulting from catch-up rates of 45.5to 36% p.a. Fourth, the findings of general 
governance are broadly consistent with those of political, economic and institutional 
governance. Fifth, the CC results are not significant for inflation and unemployment while the 
rate of AC (time to full AC) is between 7 and 10% pa (28.5-20years) for the inflation and 39 
to 39.5% p.a (5.12 to 5.06years) for unemployment. Sixth, with the exception of inflation, the 
average time to full convergence is between 4 and 5 years. We may therefore infer from a 
projection date of early 2007 that the Arab Spring could be predicted to occur between 2011 
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and 2012. The absence of convergence across some specifications and fundamental 
characteristics in Table 2 is evidence of convergence towards lower equilibria. 
 Most of the significant control variables in Table 4 have the expected signs. (1) 
Economic prosperity, trade openness and positive external balances potentially have positive 
effects on governance. (2) Positive demographic change could potentially infringe the ability 
of governments to effectively manage rising population. (3) Government expenditure that is 
channeled properly for macroeconomic prosperity could eventually mitigate inflation and 
unemployment.  
 
Table 2: Summary of the findings 
             
 Panel A: Absolute Convergence (AC) 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
 Difference GMM System GMM 
 Panel A1: Political Governance 
AC? No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No No 
Rate of AC n.a n.a 36% n.a n.a n.a n.a 20% 39% n.a n.a n.a 
Years to FAC n.a  n.a  5.55Yrs n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  10Yrs 5.12Yrs n.a  n.a  n.a  
             
 Panel A2: Economic Governance 
AC? No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Rate of AC n.a n.a 29 n.a n.a n.a 49% 47% 47.5% 41.5% n.a 49% 
Years to FAC n.a  n.a  6.89Yrs n.a  n.a  n.a  4.08Yrs 4.25Yrs 4.21Yrs 4.81Yrs n.a  4.08Yrs 
             
 Panel A3: Institutional Governance 
AC? No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rate of AC n.a 12.5% n.a 28.0% n.a n.a 45.5% n.a 40.0% 40.0% 37.5% 43.5% 
Years to FAC n.a  16Yrs n.a  7.14Yrs n.a  n.a  4.39Yrs n.a  5Yrs 5Yrs 5.33Yrs 4.59Yrs 
             
 Panel A4: General Governance 
AC? No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Rate of AC n.a 14.0% 44% n.a n.a n.a 45.5% 49.5% 44.5% 37.0% n.a 42.5% 
Years to FAC n.a  14.2Yrs 4.54Yrs n.a  n.a  n.a  4.39Yrs 4.04Yrs 4.49Yrs 5.40Yrs n.a  4.7Yrs 
             
 Panel A5: Inflation 
AC? No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Rate of AC n.a n.a 5.50% 5.00% 7.5% n.a 8.05% n.a 10.0% 9.50% n.a 7.0% 
Years to FAC n.a  n.a  36.3Yrs 40Yrs 26.6Yrs n.a  24.8Yrs n.a  20Yrs 21.0Yrs n.a  28.5Yrs 
             
 Panel A6: Unemployment 
AC? No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Rate of AC n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 39.5% n.a n.a 39.0% n.a 39.5% 
Years to FAC n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  5.06Yrs n.a  n.a  5.12Yrs n.a  5.06Yrs 
             
             
 Panel B: Conditional Convergence (CC) 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
 Difference GMM System GMM 
 Panel B1: Political Governance 
CC? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Rate of CC n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Years to FCC n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  
             
 Panel B2: Economic Governance 
CC? No No No No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Rate of CC n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 44.5% n.a n.a n.a n.a 46.5% 
Years to FCC n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  4.49Yrs n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  4.30Yrs 
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 Panel B3: Institutional Governance 
CC? No No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Rate of CC n.a n.a n.a 24.5% n.a n.a 38.0% 36% n.a n.a n.a 37.0% 
Years to FCC n.a  n.a  n.a  8.16Yrs n.a  n.a  5.26Yrs 5.55Yrs n.a  n.a  n.a  5.40Yrs 
             
 Panel B4: General Governance 
CC? No No No Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Rate of CC n.a n.a n.a 48.5% n.a n.a 42.0% 32.5% n.a 48.5% n.a 42.0% 
Years to FCC n.a  n.a  n.a  4.12Yrs n.a  n.a  4.76Yrs 6.15Yrs n.a  4.12Yrs n.a  4.76Yrs 
             
 Panel B5: Inflation 
CC? No No No Yes No No No No No No No No 
Rate of CC n.a n.a n.a 11.5% n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Years to FCC n.a  n.a  n.a  17.3Yrs n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  
             
 Panel B6:Unemployment 
CC? No n.s.a No n.s.a n.s.a No No n.s.a No n.s.a n.s.a No 
Rate of CC n.a n.s.a n.a n.s.a n.s.a n.a n.a n.s.a  n.a n.s.a n.s.a n.a 
Years to FCC n.a  n.s.a  n.a  n.s.a  n.s.a  n.a  n.a  n.s.a n.a  n.s.a  n.s.a  n.a  
             
Yes: Significant evidence of Catch-up. No: insignificant evidence of Catch-up. AC: Absolute Catch-up. CC: Conditional Catch-up. Rate of  
AC: Rate of  Absolute Catch-up.  Rate of  CC: Rate of Conditional Catch-up in years. FAC: Full Absolute Catch-up. FCC: Full Conditional 
Catch-up.  MENA: Middle East & North Africa. ME: Middle East. NA: North  Africa. SU: Short Unrest in MENA. LU: Long 
Unrest in MENA: U: Unrest in MENA. n.a: not applicable due to absence of significant catch-up. n.s.a: not specifically 
applicable because model could not be run due to issue in degrees of freedom.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Absolute convergence 
             
 Difference GMM System GMM 
             
 Panel A: Political Governance 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial 0.49** -0.063 0.76*** 0.41* 1.00 0.44** 0.350 0.40** 0.78*** 0.47** 1.13*** 0.410 
 (0.033) (0.784) (0.000) (0.080) (0.102) (0.042) (0.212) (0.018) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.144) 
AR(2) 1.894* 0.703 1.620 1.905* 0.368 1.742* 1.739* 1.266 1.607 1.913* 0.391 1.65* 
OIR 13.218 8.735 4.876 7.194 2.267 12.113 13.517 7.163 4.626 7.679 3.794 12.55 
Wald 4.53** 0.074 10.6*** 3.05* 2.672 4.11** 1.553 5.562** 18.3*** 3.96** 10.6*** 2.133 
C’tries 14 9 5 8 5 13 14 9 5 8 5 13 
Obs 56 36 20 32 20 52 70 45 25 40 25 65 
             
 Panel B: Economic Governance 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial -0.033 0.241 0.58*** 0.307 0.407 0.021 0.98*** 0.94*** 0.95*** 0.83*** 1.07*** 0.98*** 
 (0.943) (0.288) (0.000) (0.146) (0.110) (0.968) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) -1.276 -1.490 0.417 -1.214 -0.480 -1.279 -1.254 -1.564 0.480 -1.384 -0.004 -1.352 
OIR 9.926 8.450 3.921 7.455 4.238 10.33 13.266 7.565 3.785 7.230 4.809 12.915 
Wald 0.005 1.127 22.4*** 2.109 2.541 0.001 700*** 93.1*** 130*** 108*** 90.5*** 440*** 
C’tries 14 9 5 8 5 13 14 9 5 8 5 13 
Obs 56 36 20 32 20 52 70 45 25 40 25 65 
             
 Panel C: Institutional Governance 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial 0.149 0.250* 0.580 0.56* -0.001 0.315 0.91*** 0.95*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.75*** 0.87*** 
 (0.555) (0.093) (0.143) (0.072) (0.997) -0.234 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) -0.711 -1.211 0.471 -0.179 -0.839 -0.234 0.879 1.660* 0.348 -0.188 0.779 0.762 
OIR 8.754 8.551 2.847 7.873 4.932 9.719 13.723 8.877 2.409 7.702 2.360 12.99 
Wald 0.348 2.816* 2.136 3.234* 0.000 1.126 284*** 268*** 24.5*** 37.8*** 24.8*** 361*** 
C’tries 14 9 5 8 5 13 14 9 5 8 5 13 
Obs 56 36 20 32 20 52 70 45 25 40 25 65 
             
 Panel D: General Governance 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial -0.020 0.28* 0.88*** 0.465 0.134 0.031 0.91*** 0.99*** 0.89*** 0.74*** 1.06*** 0.85*** 
 (0.815) (0.013) (0.000) (0.176) (0.743) (0.818) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) -0.123 -1.126 0.350 0.201 -0.550 -0.097 -0.054 -0.545 0.346 -0.865 0.745 -0.107 
OIR 6.607 8.415 3.66 7.833 4.861 9.027 12.965 7.037 4.666 6.486 3.814 12.012 
Wald 0.054 6.10** 15.5*** 1.826 0.106 0.052 269*** 353*** 36.7*** 14.3*** 61.8*** 185*** 
C’tries 14 9 5 8 5 13 14 9 5 8 5 13 
Obs 56 36 20 32 20 52 70 45 25 40 25 65 
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 Panel E: Inflation 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial -0.054 -0.16*** 0.11* 0.10* -0.15** -0.059 0.161** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.154 0.14** 
 (0.668) (0.001) (0.081) (0.079) (0.014) (0.656) (0.033) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.143) (0.034) 
AR(2) -1.474 -1.666* -1.111 -0.685 -1.231 -1.299 -1.536 -1.663* -1.103 -0.486 -1.329 -1.370 
OIR 8.778 6.998 4.184 4.010 4.575 7.873 10.229 6.684 3.181 4.911 4.683 9.799 
Wald 0.183 10.49*** 3.031* 3.078* 6.00** 0.197 4.547** 7.30*** 14.7*** 38.3*** 2.141 4.47** 
C’tries 12 7 5 6 5 11 12 7 5 6 5 11 
Obs 45 25 20 21 20 41 57 32 25 27 25 52 
             
 Panel F: Unemployment  
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial 1.14*** 0.159 1.09*** 1.08*** -1.08 1.14*** 0.79*** 0.394 0.736 0.78*** -0.84 0.79*** 
 (0.000) (0.909) (0.001) (0.000) (0.459) (0.000) (0.000) (0.695) (0.165) (0.000) (0.538) (0.000) 
AR(2) 0.554 0.543 0.610 0.702 0.696 0.554 0.844 0.560 0.846 0.882 0.658 0.844 
OIR 3.959 0.000 3.883 2.006 0.035 3.959 3.968 n.a  3.952 2.005 0.016 3.968 
Wald 16.8*** 0.012 9.60*** 23.0*** 0.547 16.8*** 1089*** 0.153 1.927 5934*** 0.378 1089*** 
C’tries 5 1 4 3 2 5 5 1 4 3 2 5 
Obs 18 4 14 11 7 18 23 5 18 14 9 23 
             
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Initial: Lagged dependent variable.  AR(2): Second Order 
Autocorrelation test. OIR: Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions test. Z-statistics for AR(2) and Chi-square statistics for Sargan OIR and Wald 
(joint). Wald: Wald statistics for joint significance of estimated coefficients. C’tries: Countries. Obs: Observations. n.a: not application due in 
issues of degrees of freedom. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. ME: Middle East. NA: North  Africa. SU: Short Unrest in MENA. LU: 
Long Unrest in MENA: U: Unrest in MENA. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
 
Table 4: Conditional convergence 
             
 Difference GMM System GMM 
             
 Panel A: Political Governance 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial 0.238 -0.521 -2.337 0.260 -2.08 0.271 0.49*** 0.57* 0.425 0.572 -0.08 0.58*** 
 (0.549) (0.217) (0.267) (0.885) (0.239) (0.341) (0.000) (0.076) (0.725) (0.209) (0.911) (0.000) 
Constant -0.147 0.001 0.417 -0.174 0.154 -0.151 -0.522* -0.049 0.157 -0.306 -0.857 -0.508 
 (0.279) (0.988) (0.369) (0.432) (0.754) (0.118) (0.060) (0.956) (0.926) (0.842) (0.486) (0.158) 
GDPg 0.032 -0.005 -0.067 0.009 -0.028 0.009 0.05*** 0.043 0.048 0.004 0.001 0.038* 
 (0.376) (0.818) (0.461) (0.924) (0.702) (0.635) (0.001) (0.250) (0.383) (0.948) (0.976) (0.055) 
Trade -0.000 -0.011 -0.019 0.007 -0.023 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.008 0.013 0.004 
 (0.998) (0.197) (0.260) (0.814) (0.570) (0.810) (0.181) (0.664) (0.707) (0.621) (0.421) (0.210) 
Gov. Ex -0.000 0.024 --- 0.007 -0.142 -0.070 -0.0007 -0.015 --- -0.021 -0.066 0.003 
 (0.995) (0.552)  (0.938) (0.421) (0.463) (0.959) (0.681)  (0.498) (0.381) (0.747) 
Ext. Bal 0.016 0.001 --- 0.032 --- 0.004 -0.003 0.001 --- -0.005 --- -0.002 
 (0.440) (0.872)  (0.581)  (0.840) (0.666) (0.822)  (0.567)  (0.750) 
Popg -0.022 -0.018 --- -0.027 --- -0.061 -0.029 -0.041 --- --- --- -0.071 
 (0.707) (0.628)  (0.751)  (0.317) (0.305) (0.135)    (0.355) 
             
AR(2) 1.047 -0.732 1.253 0.639 n.a 1.852* 1.654* 1.349 0.820 1.881* -0.346 1.925* 
OIR 10.724 2.228 0.034 5.012 0.000 7.266 4.115 2.972 0.885 4.560 n.a 5.738 
Wald 4.823 11.03* 5.831 6.402 31.2*** 10.26 71.08*** 10.62 5.020 13.5** 66.2*** 154*** 
C’tries 14 9 5 8 5 13 14 9 5 8 5 13 
Obs 51 32 19 30 19 49 65 41 24 38 24 62 
             
 Panel B: Economic Governance 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial -0.152 -0.703 -0.171 0.215 -0.875 -0.490 0.89*** 0.9*** -0.841 0.629* 0.062 0.93*** 
 (0.686) (0.366) (0.802) (0.551) (0.322) (0.148) (0.000) (0.001) (0.470) (0.095) (0.941) (0.000) 
Constant -0.041 0.044 -0.17** -0.122 -0.22** -0.050 -0.300 -0.944 -3.45* -0.081 -1.279 -0.231 
 (0.531) (0.760) (0.048) (0.480) (0.043) (0.476) (0.521) (0.431) (0.056) (0.941) (0.130) (0.430) 
GDPg 0.008 0.015 0.0004 -0.018 -0.004 0.009 -0.010 0.006 0.014 0.011 -0.117 -0.006 
 (0.231) (0.222) (0.947) (0.727) (0.707) (0.359) (0.603) (0.836) (0.506) (0.813) (0.328) (0.770) 
Trade 0.009 0.002 0.020** 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.02*** 0.005 0.032 0.002 
 (0.212) (0.833) (0.030) (0.661) (0.780) (0.108) (0.508) (0.627) (0.000) (0.584) (0.172) (0.435) 
Gov. Ex 0.013 -0.024 --- -0.009 -0.112 -0.036 0.004 0.029 --- -0.021 -0.132 0.004 
 (0.799) (0.329)  (0.924) (0.178) (0.373) (0.226) (0.338)  (0.496) (0.343) (0.235) 
Ext. Bal 0.002 -0.012 --- --- --- -0.006 0.002 0.002 --- --- --- 0.001 
 (0.820) (0.210)    (0.428) (0.327) (0.578)    (0.592) 
Popg -0.033 -0.051 --- --- --- -0.08*** -0.010 -0.015 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.229) (0.102)    (0.001) (0.442) (0.533)     
             
AR(2) -0.128 -0.471 1.724 1.877* -0.179 0.174 -1.457 -1.74* 1.434 1.858* 1.140 -1.529 
OIR 8.544 2.098 1.140 4.314 0.000 6.287 6.304 4.236 0.115 5.029 n.a 5.948 
Wald 11.66* 16.9*** n.a 1.589 12.39** 42.5*** 34559*** 280*** n.s.a  11.4** 1826*** 1786*** 
C’tries 14 9 5 8 5 13 14 9 5 8 5 13 
Obs 51 32 19 30 19 49 65 41 24 38 24 62 
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 Panel C: Institutional Governance 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial 0.282 0.206 -1.289 0.49** -4.35* 0.111 0.76*** 0.72*** -0.461 1.528 -0.742 0.74*** 
 (0.587) (0.760) (0.665) (0.010) (0.074) (0.802) (0.000) (0.000) (0.682) (0.135) (0.368) (0.000) 
Constant 0.021 0.082 -0.039 0.128 1.611* -0.033 -0.488** -1.120 -3.338 2.061 -3.61* -0.49** 
 (0.897) (0.606) (0.764) (0.253) (0.076) (0.743) (0.026) (0.452) (0.237) (0.598) (0.056) (0.026) 
GDPg -0.024 -0.042 0.006 -0.035 0.13** -0.001 -0.032 -0.052 0.013 -0.079 -0.10* -0.040* 
 (0.732) (0.288) (0.926) (0.133) (0.029) (0.979) (0.150) (0.128) (0.573) (0.179) (0.080) (0.097) 
Trade 0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.010 -0.007 0.012 0.005** 0.009 0.030 -0.018 0.05** 0.007*** 
 (0.680) (0.728) (0.702) (0.532) (0.658) (0.223) (0.012) (0.100) (0.278) (0.624) (0.039) (0.000) 
Gov. Ex 0.097* 0.118** 0.113 0.08*** 0.759* 0.09** 0.010 0.030 --- -0.017 -0.15** 0.008 
 (0.079) (0.049) (0.236) (0.000) (0.055) (0.038) (0.186) (0.510)  (0.707) (0.035) (0.341) 
Ext. Bal 0.008 0.004 --- -0.001 --- 0.010 0.001 0.006 --- -0.009 --- 0.001 
 (0.587) (0.414)  (0.858)  (0.212) (0.528) (0.472)  (0.621)  (0.391) 
Popg -0.051 -0.044 --- --- --- -0.07** 0.001 --- --- --- --- -0.045 
 (0.232) (0.390)    (0.011) (0.983)     (0.218) 
             
             
AR(2) 0.133 0.484 0.555 0.401 n.a -0.243 0.186 0.110 0.389 -0.692 -0.155 0.297 
OIR 10.715 4.928 0.000 0.321 0.000 7.740 5.979 3.450 0.071 2.552 0.000 4.838 
Wald 17.04*** 13.91** 2.859 22.7*** 5.232 23.2*** 604*** 204*** 28*** 137*** 283*** 569*** 
C’tries 14 9 5 8 5 13 14 9 5 8 5 13 
Obs 51 32 19 30 19 49 65 41 24 38 24 62 
             
 Panel D: General Governance 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial 0.276 0.270 0.043 0.97** -0.637 0.062 0.84*** 0.65** -0.219 0.97** 0.341 0.84*** 
 (0.422) (0.633) (0.944) (0.022) (0.240) (0.870) (0.000) (0.048) (0.765) (0.033) (0.678) (0.000) 
Constant -0.035 0.006 0.138 -0.078 0.266 -0.063 -0.646 -1.353 -2.0*** 0.507 -3.78* -0.516 
 (0.806) (0.966) (0.789) (0.571) (0.509) (0.689) (0.240) (0.488) (0.001) (0.794) (0.074) (0.518) 
GDPg 0.015 -0.017 0.046 -0.016 0.017 0.014 0.008 -0.020 0.009 -0.004 0.019 0.010 
 (0.556) (0.299) (0.202) (0.443) (0.467) (0.451) (0.790) (0.583) (0.584) (0.862) (0.904) (0.755) 
Trade 0.007 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.033 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.009 -0.005 0.039 0.005 
 (0.564) (0.917) (0.985) (0.775) (0.394) (0.446) (0.333) (0.444) (0.420) (0.803) (0.184) (0.559) 
Gov. Ex 0.069 0.061 0.043 0.059 -0.146 0.026 0.011 0.026 --- -0.001 -0.060 0.012 
 (0.276) (0.470) (0.648) (0.473) (0.222) (0.684) (0.241) (0.479)  (0.933) (0.768) (0.250) 
Ext. Bal 0.014 0.005 --- 0.018** --- 0.010 0.001 0.011 --- --- --- 0.002 
 (0.138) (0.768)  (0.022)  (0.393) (0.513) (0.182)    (0.426) 
Popg -0.055 -0.024 --- --- --- -0.11** -0.021 --- --- --- --- -0.086 
 (0.350) (0.650)    (0.041) (0.773)     (0.422) 
             
AR(2) -0.162 -1.149 1.205 -1.239 0.368 0.206 -0.380 -0.484 1.309 -1.343 -0.176 -0.212 
OIR 7.402 2.690 0.000 1.554 0.000 7.459 8.553 4.699 0.041 3.332 0.000 7.183 
Wald 3.152 7.185 4.469 19.6*** 25.6*** 7.613 679*** 761*** 3.161 17.5*** 451*** 560*** 
C’tries 14 9 5 8 5 13 14 9 5 8 5 13 
Obs 51 32 19 30 19 49 65 41 24 38 24 62 
             
 Panel E: Inflation 
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA  ME NA SU LU U 
Initial 0.003 -0.064 0.072 0.23*** -0.117 0.066 0.189 0.033 0.276 0.125 1.766* 0.216 
 (0.983) (0.373) (0.975) (0.000) (0.528) (0.594) (0.201) (0.711) (0.767) (0.734) (0.085) (0.124) 
Constant 0.258 1.62*** 5.906 0.65** 9.493 -0.128 1.340 17.22* -11.45 0.324 217.9 0.725 
 (0.737) (0.004) (0.870) (0.026) (0.244) (0.776) (0.636) (0.054) (0.807) (0.910) (0.129) (0.742) 
GDPg 0.251 -0.098 0.651 -0.059 3.154 0.090 0.345 0.017 0.906* 0.062 -7.46 0.264 
 (0.464) (0.401) (0.709) (0.311) (0.184) (0.514) (0.206) (0.963) (0.068) (0.627) (0.177) (0.131) 
Trade 0.027 0.039 -0.406 -0.015 -0.005 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.036 0.104 0.010 -1.079 0.006 
 (0.781) (0.380) (0.894) (0.740) (0.978) (0.986) (0.988) (0.254) (0.847) (0.804) (0.124) (0.711) 
Gov. Ex 0.301 0.337 -0.094 --- 6.326 -0.39** -0.079* -0.54** 0.154 --- -5.522 -0.07** 
 (0.480) (0.388) (0.983)  (0.372) (0.023) (0.051) (0.027) (0.752)  (0.117) (0.021) 
Ext. Bal 0.120 0.015 --- --- --- 0.038 -0.001 --- --- --- --- -0.007 
 (0.515) (0.833)    (0.716) (0.943)     (0.606) 
Popg --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
             
             
AR(2) -1.538 -0.962 0.166 -0.537 0.882 -1.850* -1.815* -0.910 -1.353 -0.762 0.160 -1.868* 
OIR 8.986 0.699 0.000 2.698 0.000 2.670 7.494 2.614 0.000 3.871 n.s.a 3.265 
Wald 3.966 30.3*** 30.8*** 77.2*** 24.2*** 23.2*** 23.2*** 39.9*** 75*** 1.100 34*** 27.3*** 
C’tries 12 7 5 6 5 11 12 7 5 6 5 11 
Obs 42 23 19 21 19 40 54 30 24 27 24 51 
             
 Panel F: Unemployment  
 MENA ME NA SU LU U MENA ME NA SU LU U 
Initial 1.792** --- -0.147 --- --- -0.029 2.592 --- 2.870* --- --- 0.190 
 (0.040)  (0.868)   (0.770) (0.146)  (0.099)   (0.225) 
Constant -6.186* --- -1.763 --- --- 0.027 -46.29 --- -53.41 --- --- 0.956 
 (0.081)  (0.373)   (0.945) (0.534)  (0.174)   (0.729) 
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GDPg 1.415* --- 0.544 --- --- 0.178 0.806 --- 1.244 --- --- 0.318 
 (0.098)  (0.491)   (0.616) (0.445)  (0.318)   (0.403) 
Trade 0.977* --- -0.137 --- --- 0.022 0.186 --- 0.234 --- --- 0.010 
 (0.097)  (0.334)   (0.750) (0.742)  (0.109)   (0.729) 
Gov. Ex 1.773 --- --- --- --- -0.290* 0.952 --- --- --- --- -0.10** 
 (0.195)     (0.057) (0.285)     (0.041) 
Ext. Bal --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
             
Popg --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
             
             
AR(2) n.a n.s.a 0.698 n.s.a n.s.a -1.542 -1.273 n.s.a -1.064 n.s.a n.s.a -1.81* 
OIR n.a n.s.a  n.a  n.s.a  n.s.a  7.784 n.a n.s.a  0.000 n.s.a  n.s.a  8.751 
Wald 10.99** n.s.a 5.539 n.s.a n.s.a 13.8*** 652*** n.s.a 3.037 n.s.a n.s.a 10.94** 
C’tries 5 n.s.a  4 n.s.a  n.s.a  11 5 n.s.a  4 n.s.a  n.s.a  11 
Obs 18 n.s.a 14 n.s.a n.s.a 40 23 n.s.a 18 n.s.a n.s.a 51 
             
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Initial: Lagged dependent variable.  AR(2): Second Order 
Autocorrelation test. OIR: Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions test. Z-statistics for AR(2) and Chi-square statistics for Sargan OIR and Wald 
(joint). GDPg: GDP growth. Gov. Ex: Government Expenditure. Ext. Bal: External Balance. Popg: Population growth. Wald: Wald statistics 
for joint significance of estimated coefficients. C’tries: Countries. Obs: Observations. n.a: not applicable due in issues of degrees of freedom. 
n.s.a: not specifically applicable because model could not be run due to issue in degrees of freedom. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. 
ME: Middle East. NA: North  Africa. SU: Short Unrest in MENA. LU: Long Unrest in MENA: U: Unrest in MENA. The significance of 
bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) 
no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
 
 
 
4. 2 Discussion of results, caveats and future direction 
4.2.1 Discussion of results 
 Consistent with the recent bulk of empirics in the catch-up literature, it is important to 
understand the underpinnings of absolute and conditional convergences before discussing the 
results. Absolute convergence (AC) is principally the end of common factors: inter alia, the 
adoption of single currency and monetary unions. The framework of the study extends well 
beyond monetary policies to common governance conditions among countries. Hence, AC 
means that states share the same fundamental characteristics with respect to governance 
conditions such that the only difference between the countries is in initial levels of 
governance. Therefore the absence of AC in some panels could be due to differences in 
starting-levels of governance. On the other hand, the presence of AC implies that beyond the 
possibility of dissimilar initial conditions among countries, there are certain common regional 
factors (from without) that have led to countries with poor governance catching-up to their 
counterparts with poorer governance conditions.  
 Conversely, conditional convergence (CC) shows the type of catch-up whereby the 
country’s long-term equilibrium or steady state is conditional on the structural and 
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institutional characteristics that are fundamental to the economy or market. Thus, when 
countries within the same fundamental characteristic are different in the factors determining 
governance conditions, it is likely for conditional convergence to occur. In essence, if 
countries differ in structural and institutional characteristics relating the quality of 
government, then CC can take place. Hence, this type of catch-up is contingent on the 
variables selected and empirically tested. With constraints in degrees of freedom needed for 
the overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test in this type of catch-up, we have based the analysis 
on five macroeconomic variables (economic prosperity, trade openness, government 
expenditure, external balances, population growth). This conditioning information set is quite 
robust because some CC estimations in the recent literature have not been contingent on more 
than two variables (Bruno et al., 2012).  In essence, CC could take place if there are cross-
country MENA differences in the conditioning information set that determine governance, 
inflation and unemployment. Hence, the overwhelming evidence of CC implies differences in 
factors related to the dependent variables (quality of government, stability of food prices and 
unemployment) are blurring. In other words, while catch-up implies the possibility that a 
common revolution is feasible; full catch-up produces the timeline for such a possibility.  
 We have observed from the findings above that with the exception of inflation, the 
average time for full catch-up is between 4 and  5 years. Given a periodicity of 1996 to 2006, 
with a projection date of early 2007, it is feasible for the Arab Spring to have occurred 
between 2011 and 2012. But what is the  insight underpinning this feasibility? Addressing this 
question is crucial to understanding the empirical results. A full catch-up period of 4 to 5 
years in factors (poor governance, unemployment and inflation) likely to incite social unrest 
in the MENA region from a projection date of 2007 further implies that, between 2011 and 
2012: (1) countries with the poor governance have completely caught-up with states with 
poorer government quality (political, economic and institutional); (2) nations with high  
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unemployment rates have reached the higher unemployment rates observed in neighbouring  
countries and (3) countries with low inflation rates are now experiencing soaring food prices 
by the same degree as those with high initial inflation figures.   
 With the above three scenarios united, any spark of protest in one country can spread 
to others,  meaning that between 2011 and 2012, conditions for  a revolution were without 
distinction of nationality or locality in the MENA region. In other words, poor governance, 
inflation and unemployment levels were comparable across the group of MENA countries 
during the time of the mass uprising. In essence, full catch-up in the period (2011 to 2012) 
further indicates that the cross-country politico-economic differences are inexistent in the 
MENA such that a revolution in one country could  easily spread to other countries with the 
same governance, unemployment and inflation. In other words, factors that incite social unrest 
are similar across countries, paving the way for revolutions to spread without distinction of 
locality or nationality. In summary, the possibility of revolutions is completely harmonized 
across countries. This interpretation is broadly consistent with the majority of recent catch-up 
literature. 
4.2.2 Caveats, cautions and future direction 
 
 Two main caveats of, and two principal cautions in the empirics are worth discussing. 
While the former entails issues in the theoretical and empirical underpinnings, the latter 
concerns signals in the dependent variables and structure of independent variables.    
 First, the use of econometrics to achieve more than just testing the validity of existing 
theories  is not without drawbacks. However, the hypotheses underlying the study are  
strongly supported by the vast amount of recent studies in catch-up literature  which used the 
same empirical underpinnings.  
 Second, while we have already justified the choice of the catch-up approach in the 
empirical section, it is also interesting to point-out the shortcomings of such a strategy. We 
28 
 
have stopped short of computing corresponding sigma-convergence coefficients because the 
analysis is an adaption to a methodological innovation in the estimation beta-convergence. As 
emphasized by Apergis et al. (2010), critics of this catch-up approach dispute that if countries 
converge to a common equilibrium, then the dispersion of the dependent variables should in 
the long-term converge on the same path. On the other hand, Miller & Upadhyay ( 2002) have 
claimed that if countries converge to their own unique equilibriums or convergence clubs, 
then the dispersion of this indicator will not approach zero. In addition, the dispersion 
movement is conditional on the initial distribution of the variables.     
 Some emphasis on caution is also worthwhile. (1) Signaling is important in correctly 
calibrating the dependent variables because social unrest and revolutions are most likely only 
in the presence of negative signals or information. While consumer price inflation and 
unemployment rate are negative signal variables, governance indicators are generally intended 
to reflect positive signals. Hence, catch-up in governance indicators may be construed as 
positive and a mitigating factor to any potential revolution. This does not represent an issue in 
our analysis for two main reasons: range in measurement of government variables and 
skewness of governance in the MENA region.  First, governance variables have positive and 
negative values which broadly represent good and bad governance. Second, most governance 
variables are overwhelmingly skewed to the left (negative), implying that the MENA 
countries have bad governance on average. (2) On the structure of the conditioning 
information set, caution is recommended in the interpretation of the results because 
conditional catch-up modeling is contingent on the variables we choose and empirically test. 
Hence, indicators may not directly reflect all macroeconomic differences needed for 
conditional catch-up to take place. As we have outlined before, there is nothing we can do 
about this because the conditioning information set bears an inverse relation with degrees of 
freedom needed for conditional modeling.  
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 Since the term “Arab Spring” is attributed to the diffusion of the revolutionary 
movements in the Arab Countries, one is tempted to think that better instruments could be 
provided by spatial econometrics tools which could appropriately take into account diffusion 
and spillover effects. This is an interesting future research direction.  
 
Conclusion 
 This study has assessed the predictability of the 2011 Arab Spring mass insurrection. 
We have examined whether these revolutions could have been foreseen due to a complete 
elimination in the dispersion of core demands for better political, economic and institutional 
governance, more jobs and stable consumer prices. A recent methodological innovation in 
catch-up has been employed to investigate the feasibility and timing of a potential revolution. 
The intuition for such a general unrest is twofold: (1) evidence of catch-up in deplorable 
politico-economic conditions implies that MENA countries with depraved governance are 
catching-up with their counterparts under  worse government and (2) full catch-up means that 
politico-economic differences are non-existent such that any spark of protest in one country 
can easily spread across borders. In this context, the possibility of a revolution is completely 
harmonized across countries.   
 The empirical evidence which has been based on fourteen MENA countries for the 
period 1996 to 2006 reveals that from a projection date of 2007, the Arab Spring was 
predictable within 4 to 5 years or between 2011 and 2012. This paper  attempted to answer a 
key concern on whether political and economic trends were common in North African 
countries prior to the Arab Spring. Such should contribute to   the empirics of predicting 
revolutions and the scarce literature on modeling the future of socio-economic events. It is 
also original in its approach to understanding past trends in political and economic policies 
leading to the rolling back of countries. Caveats, cautions and a future research direction have 
been discussed.  
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 Like Blinder (1987), we ask the reader to understand that this is an expositional 
analysis. We do not wish to advocate that revolutions can be predicted in a  strict sense based 
on these empirics. But the spirit of the paper is that when cross-country dispersions in signals 
of revolutions and social unrest are in course of being completely eradicated, reforms are 
needed to prevent the potential consequences of cross-country politico-economic and social 
revolutions.   
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.180 0.778 -2.030 1.113 84 
Voice & Accountability  -0.828 0.416 -1.920 -0.183 84 
Political Governance  0.146 1.081 -2.426 1.777 84 
Government Effectiveness  -0.038 0.531 -1.100 0.837 84 
Regulation Quality  -0.113 0.631 -1.947 1.111 84 
Economic Governance  -0.044 1.361 -3.360 2.500 84 
Rule of Law 0.027 0.630 -1.450 0.887 84 
Control of Corruption  -0.042 0.603 -0.973 1.225 84 
Institutional Governance 0.007 1.338 -2.719 2.256 84 
General Governance 0.031 2.064 -4.062 3.546 84 
Inflation 3.394 5.047 -9.305 30.734 69 
Unemployment  10.590 7.185 0.700 29.800 46 
GDP Growth 4.704 2.826 -2.800 13.760 79 
Trade Openness  83.701 29.571 38.690 173.83 81 
Government Expenditure  15.169 8.889 2.250 33.012 81 
External Balance on Commodities 4.663 17.964 -42.404 41.985 81 
Population growth  2.644 2.329 0.012 15.668 84 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 2: Correlation analysis 
            
Polgov Ecogov Instgov G.Gov Infl. Unempl GDPg Trade Gov.Ex Ext.Bal Popg  
1.000 0.765 0.831 0.887 -0.155 -0.623 0.197 0.359 0.232 -0.002 0.220 Polgov 
 1.000 0.863 0.948 -0.186 -0.540 0.208 0.622 0.146 0.087 0.263 Ecogov 
  1.000 0.967 -0.299 -0.705 0.2112 0.510 0.306 0.234 0.277 Instgov 
   1.000 -0.253 -0.673 0.223 0.555 0.250 0.155 0.276 G.Gov 
    1.000 0.230 0.155 -0.124 -0.188 -0.231 0.209 Infl. 
     1.000 -0.107 -0.255 -0.626 -0.338 -0.429 Unempl 
      1.000 0.248 -0.152 0.242 0.435 GDPg 
       1.000 0.306 0.161 0.319 Trade 
        1.000 0.147 0.143 Gov.Ex 
         1.000 0.291 Ext.Bal 
          1.000 Popg 
            
Polgov: Political governance. Ecogov: Economic governance. Instgov: Institutional governance. G.Gov: General governance. Infl: Inflation. 
Unempl: Unemployment. GDPg: GDP growth. Gov. Ex: Government Expenditure. Ext.Bal: External Balance on commodities. Popg: 
Population growth.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov “First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced”. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption 
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov “First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption 
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them” 
PCA 
    
General 
Governance  
G.gov “First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances”  
PCA 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Unemployment  Unempl Total Unemployment (% of Total Labour Force)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP growth  GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness Trade Export plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government 
Expenditure   
Gov.Ex Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
External Balance  Ext.Bal External Balance on Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population growth Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
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Appendix 4: Fundamental panels  
      
MENA ME NA MENASU MENALU MENAU 
      
Algeria   Algeria  Algeria   Algeria  
Bahrain  Bahrain    Bahrain Bahrain  
Egypt  Egypt  Egypt Egypt 
Jordan Jordan  Jordan  Jordan 
Kuwait  Kuwait   Kuwait  Kuwait 
Lebanon  Lebanon   Lebanon   Lebanon  
Libya   Libya   Libya  Libya  
Morocco   Morocco  Morocco   Morocco  
Oman Oman  Oman  Oman 
Qatar  Qatar      
Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabia   Saudi Arabia   Saudi Arabia  
Tunisia    Tunisia   Tunisia Tunisia  
UAE UAE  UAE  UAE 
Yemen Yemen   Yemen Yemen 
14 9 5 8 5 13 
      
MENA: Middle East and North Africa. ME: Middle East. NA: North Africa. MENASU: MENA Short Unrests. MENALU: 
MENA Long Unrests. MENAU: MENA Unrests.  
 
Appendix 5: Correlation analysis for Governance variables  
       
VA PS RQ GE RL CC  
       
1.000 0.659 0.701 0.680 0.723 0.665 VA 
 1.000 0.630 0.640 0.795 0.684 PS 
  1.000 0.812 0.814 0.729 RQ 
   1.000 0.883 0.836 GE 
    1.000 0.871 RL 
     1.000 CC 
       
VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC:Control 
of Corruption.. 
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